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Abstract. This paper addresses the impact of institutions and social capital on economic 
development of Nigeria. It advanced an argument that economic prosperity of a country is 
embedded in social organizations and transformations of her institutions built from social 
capital. The methodology adopted was quantitative and qualitative. The results present a 
declining negative impact of social capital and institutional variables on economic 
development; affirming the importance of social capital on institutional quality. Therefore, 
the way forward is taking a tougher stance against abuse of power and employ mechanism of 
social capital to reconcile conflict among social, political and economic interest groups.  
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1. Introduction 
ne of the unanswered question confronting growth and development 
economists over decades is why poverty and underdevelopment thrives in 
countries with resource endowment. Of primary importance to economic 
outcomes of richly resource endowed countries are the economic institutions that 
exist in that country. These institutions may include the regulatory institutions, 
conflict management institutions and the property rights institutions etc. Prosperity 
and economic development of any economy the world over can be said to be 
determined to an extent by the differences in economic institutions and social capital 
in operation. The differences in institutions in a given country be it political or 
economic are fundamental to their level of growth. Naturally, the way that humans 
of a given society decide to organise themselves, determines their prosperity or 
doom. Therefore, Institutions cannot strive without a good social capital in existence.  
Social capital refers to the internal social and cultural cohesion of society, the norms 
and values that govern interactions among people and the institutions in which they 
are embedded. Social capital is the glue that holds societies together and without 
which there can be no economic growth or human well-being, (Miruka & Omenya 
2009). Without social capital, society at large will collapse (Malhotra, 2003). The 
appeal to the concept of social capital is tied to the fact that it does not require 
substantial funds for its implementation, and that it can present great potential for 
accelerated economic development in Nigeria.   
The popularity of institutions started gaining grounds in the early 1990’s due to 
the international differences in conceptions of economic development, even within 
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the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF) (Stein, 2008). Ever since 
then, institutions have occupied the centre stage in the debate of economic 
development.  It is the perception that institutions are the root cause of economic 
problems in developing countries that has triggered the IMF and World Bank to start 
imposing many governance –related conditionality, which requires that the 
borrowing country adopts ‘better’ institutions that improve ‘governance’ (Kapur & 
Webber, 2000; Chang, 2010) of which Nigeria is no exception.  
Developing countries have been subjected to serious pressure both formal and 
informali to adopt ‘better’ institutionsiioften called the Global Standard Institutions 
(GSIs); which are assumed to be maximising market freedom and protecting private 
property rights effectivelyiii. The challenges to solve the problem of development and 
poverty in an economy like Nigeria richly endowed with natural and human 
resources hinges on the reformation of economic institutions which are collective 
choices from the outcome of political process and social capital. Social capital in this 
sense is the bond which holds a society together. It is the relationship and norms that 
guides, shapes and direct institution’s quality and quantity of social interactions 
which facilitates coordination and corporation. In this sense, reformation and 
strengthening of institutions necessary for economic prosperity of a country is 
possible when there is social capital underpinnings in the society. 
 In Nigeria, like any other economy, conflicts over social decisions and choices 
exist with attendant consequences. These conflicts exist because different groups and 
individuals typically benefit from different economic institutions over social choices 
which are ultimately resolved in favour of groups with greater political power 
(Acemoglu, Johnson & Robinson, 2005). The economic institutions of a society 
depend on the nature of political institutions and the distribution of political power in 
society (Acemoglu & Robinson 2010). According to Acemoglu et al. (2005) political 
institutions allocate de jure political power, while groups with greater economic 
might typically possess greater de facto political power. That this dynamic variables 
change over time because prevailing economic institutions affects the distribution of 
resources and because groups with de facto political power today strive to change 
political institutions in order to increase their de jure political power in future. The 
pitfalls of the institutional reforms equilibrium have made very difficult the 
reformation of economic institutions. Therefore, movement to a successful path of 
economic development and bridging the poverty gap would entail a better 
recognition and understanding of the forces militating against social capital and 
institutional framework development. Economic institutions shape the incentives of 
key economic actors of the society. They also influence the organisation of 
production, investment in physical, human and capital technology, which is pivotal 
to economic growth and development. 
This paper addresses how lapses in institutions and social capital affect the 
development of the Nigerian economy. The paper also addresses the confusion of 
measurement of the degree of social capital and quality of institutions by trying to 
look at a more plausible measure borrowing from different theories and researchers. 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows; section two provides the theoretical 
argument of growth and development and the different theoretical views of 
institutions. Section three discusses the complexity of causality between social 
capital, institution and development, while section four talks about the place of 
social capital sand institutions in economic development and section five is on the 
measure of institutions and social capital; section six focuses on the methodology 
while section seven is the analysis of qualitative and quantitative results and finally 
section eights concludes the paper.  
 
2.Theoretical Arguments 
2.1. Link between Social Capital and Institutions 
Before looking at contemporary scholarly views on the best institutions paradigm 
we need to briefly highlight the link between social capital and institutions. It is clear 
that institutional crisis in Nigeria with such symptoms as failure of rule of law, 
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autocracy, etc. are likely to mitigate good institutions based on the internationally 
agreed principles of best institutions. Therefore, for the sustainable economic 
development of Nigeria, we need to bridge institutional gaps with social capital. The 
concept of social capital offers institutions an opportunity to make progress towards 
higher levels of cooperation and collaboration with various social players such as the 
private sector, political class, and citizens. From the forgoing, Vigoda-Gadot (2004) 
argues that, from the experiences of the Israeli government, a collaborative approach 
in the delivery of public services is in the end a socially desirable trend with 
meaningful benefits that reach far beyond the important idea of responsiveness. 
Thus, the idea of collaborative administration fits very well with the assumptions of 
participatory democracy which is embedded in social capital.  It has been shown, for 
instance, that high-quality popular participation can affect participants’ beliefs in 
desirable ways (see Halvorsen, 2003).  Halvorsen (2003) argues that there is a high 
correlation between exposure to quality participation and participant beliefs about 
the trustworthiness and responsiveness of an institution. 
 
2.2. Constraints to Social Capital Accumulation 
There exist constraints to the formation and accumulation of social capital.  
Notable scholars like Mancur Olson (1982) and North (1995), have identified factors 
that might mitigate the problems of economic resourcefulness and evade collective 
action which are the basis of social capital. According to them, collective action is 
more feasible for smaller homogenous groups. The longer the existence of groups or 
members interactions with one another the more coherent and stable is its social 
capital. Effective accumulation of appreciable stocks of social capital is constrained 
according to the game theorists developed over the years (Putnam, 1993). The first 
identified constraint is the public good characteristics that pervade social capital. 
Public goods are goods often provided by the state. According to (Miruka & 
Omenya, 2009), Public good becomes problematic in societies where the state is not 
seen as legitimate and hence everyone scrambles to get as much as possible from the 
state by investing as little as possible into the common pool. Another identified 
constraint is the tragedy of the commons, where no herder is able to limit grazing by 
other herders’ flock. The ones who lose are those who limit their own grazing, yet 
uncontrolled grazing destroys the common meadow on which the livelihood of all 
herders depends. (Miruka & Omenya, 2009). This situation is common in the Nigeria 
public domain. An example is the persistent bribe giving as well as bribe taking in 
public provisioning. Particular officials who do not take bribes may be seen as naïve 
just as those citizens who do not pay bribes while seeking government services may 
continually lose out to those who pay bribes. 
Second is the dismal logic of collective action. In this scenario every agent would 
benefit if all struck simultaneously. This scenario may best be explained by the quest 
for democratic reforms against military dictatorship and colonisation as experienced 
in Nigeria and other Sub-Saharan African countries. Those activists who were the 
first to talk openly against the high-handedness of the government and the ruling 
party often lost property or even life (Badejo, 2006). Thus, even though it benefited 
everyone once democratic gains were made, it took a great deal of conviction for 
anyone to speak out openly against injustices of the system (Miruka & Omenya, 
2009). However, whoever strikes first risks betrayal by facing the consequences 
alone, so everyone waits, waiting to benefit from some other agent’s haste (Miruka 
& Omenya, 2009). 
Different traditional and vibrant economic theories have existed with insights 
about the mechanics of economic growth, but weak in the fundamentals for 
economic growth and development. Some of these theories include the traditional 
neoclassical growth models by (Solow, 1956; Cass, 1965; Koopmans, 1965) which 
explained differences in Cross- Country factor accumulations to be due either to 
saving rates, preferences and total factor productivity growth without actually 
explaining differences in income and growth by variations in institutions. Also on 
the list are the recent growth theories by Romer (1986) Lucas (1988), Romer (1990), 
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Grossman & Helpman (1991), Aghion & Hawit (1992) who differed a little by 
emphasising that externalities from physical and human-capital accumulation could 
induce sustained steady-state growth and technical progress; but still toying the line 
of traditional neoclassical growth model by explaining differences in growth rates in 
terms of preferences and endowment. North & Thomas (1973) in their contribution 
to growth theory emphasises that innovation, economies of scale, education and 
capital accumulation as listed by other traditional theories are not just causes of 
growth; but they are growth. The factor accumulation and innovation are only 
proximate causes of growth. According to them, the fundamental explanation of 
comparative growth is differences in institutions. This takes us to the different 
theories of institutions and social capital. 
 
2.3. Social conflict view of institutions versus vertical and horizontal 
associations of social capital 
The differences in institutions in a given country be it political or economic are 
fundamental to the level of growth. Naturally, ‚it is the way that humans of a given 
society decide to organize themselves, that determines their prosperity or doom. The 
social conflict view is of the notion that the politically powerful elites often opt for 
economic institutions that favours them at the expense of the society. North (1981) 
was the first to systematically develop this point of view in economic literature 
(Acemoglu et al., 2005). While the general view of this theory is that the type and 
nature of institutions in a given country (political or economic) are often chosen by 
the group that controls political power at the expense of the society (sometimes 
amidst conflict with other groups). The vertical and horizontal association of social 
capital views the behaviour within and among organisations which recognises the 
ties necessary for giving communities a sense of identity and common purpose. The 
pursuit and bridging of ties that transcend various social divide such as political, 
religion and socioeconomic is a sure way to sustainable economic development.  The 
social conflict view is characterised with periods where economic institutions may 
initially be efficient given some circumstances and later turn to be inefficient, once 
the environment changes. 
 
2.4. The Political Coase Theorem (Efficient Institutions View) 
This view has its underpinnings from Coase Theorem, by Coase (1960). This 
theory is of the view that societies will choose socially efficient economic 
institutions without necessarily considering how the surpluses will be distributed 
among the different groups or agents. The original view by Coase (1960) is that 
whenever different parties could negotiate costlessly, they will be able to bargain to 
internalize potential externalities. ‚A classic example of this theory is a scenario 
when of a health centre which suffers from the discharge of effluence from a 
chemical company, bargaining and pays the chemical factory owner to control and 
reduce the discharge of the waste‛. This theory was latter coined Political Coase 
Theorem (Acemoglu, 2003) because of the notion that the coasian logic is applied in 
both political and economic life. The contrasting point of the social conflict view 
from the ideological view point is that it can lead to choices of economic institutions 
which cause underdevelopment. In this scenario, the economic institutions that arise 
depend on who has political power to create or block them. 
In terms of efficient institutions view, North & Thomas (1973) in their argument 
concluded that feudal economic institutions such as serfdom were an efficient 
contract between serf and lords. While Becker (1958) and Wittman (1989) in looking 
at the free riding problems inherent in the creation of efficient economic institutions 
argued that in democracies, competition among pressure groups and political parties 
will lead to efficient policies and collective choices. 
 
2.5. Incidental Institutions View versus theory of enabling social and 
political environment of social capital 
Journal of Economic and Social Thought 
JEST, 4(2), E.O. Ifere, & N.O. Doki, p.232-246. 
236 
 The theory of incidental institutions view is based on the fact that historical 
accidents at critical juncture determine institutions, and these institutions persist for a 
long time with significant consequences (Acemoglu, 2005). Supporting theories to 
this view include the theory of Political Institutions by Moore (1960). Others are the 
works of Shleifer et al. (1998; 1999), Djankov et al. (2002; 2003), Glaeser & 
Shleifer (2002).  Moore (1960) explained the different path of political development 
by investigating the evolution of Britain into democracy and Germany into facism 
and why Russia succumbed to a communist revolution. According to Moores theory, 
democracy emerged when there was a strong politically assertive commercial middle 
class and when agriculture had commercialized so that there were no feudal labour 
relationship in the country side. He further stressed that class coalitions and the way 
agriculture is organised determine which political institutions will emerge. On the 
social capital angle, the social capital theory of enabling social and political 
environment accounts for the social and political environment responsible for 
shaping social structure and development of norms. This determines the operation, 
structure and relationship of formalised institutions in terms of virtues and vices as 
well as forging ties in the society. In short, social and economic development of a 
state thrives when there is social stability as a result of pursuit of common goals by 
the whole community. 
 
3. Complexity of Causality between Institutions and  Economic 
Development 
There exist a complex relationship between institutions and development yet to 
be fully addressed by researchers in the area of economic development. Chang 
(2010) sees this discourse to suffer from two categories of theoretical problems. His 
first argument assumes that causality runs from institutions to economic 
development, ignoring the fact that economic development can change institutions.  
Second, the causal relationship is theorized in a simplistic linear and static way 
expressing causality from institutions to development. However, in trying to find out 
if better institutions lead to effective economic development, researchers like 
Acemoglu et al. (2005); North, (2005) have supported the idea that institutions are 
the ultimate determinants of economic performance thereby neglecting the causality 
from development to institutions. On the other hand, the argument is that economic 
development can also have a causal change on institutions. When a country 
experiences increase in wealth due to growth, there is bound to be a higher demand 
for new agents of change.  (i.e higher quality institutions either political or economic 
with protective laws etc). In this case, causality may be stronger from economic 
development improving institutions, than institutions promoting economic 
development. This is evidenced from the fact that most of today’s rich countries 
acquired their most cherished so called better institutions after they became rich. Not 
in their earlier stage of development. But the central point is that it is usually their 
social capital that has triggered and sustained the tempo to this stage. The 
complication of this causality has only given us a partial picture thereby leaving us 
in the dark box of not understanding fully how institutions/social capital and 
economic development interact with each other in order to give the right policy 
advice. 
Chang, (2002) called this complication the ‘late –comer’ effect; as a situation 
where developing countries (late comers) import superior institutions without having 
to pay for their development. According to him this developing countries tend to 
have institutions that are more developed than what their standards of material 
development would strictly demand, making it difficult to identify the exact 
relationship between institutions and development. 
However, it is not all about causality, but we must not fail to recognise that the 
relationship is not linear; it changes over time even in the same society and also 
differs across societies especially between development and developing countries. 
This complexity still plays back when we carry out an empirical test using time 
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series evidence. This may include historical narratives and comparative historical 
studies; for example some if not all sub-Saharan African countries had their per 
capita income and other economic growth variables much faster in the 1960’s and 
1970’s when they lacked liberalized (better) institutions. Now with the pressure to 
reform their institutions (which is often done by the bilateral, regional and 
multilateral trade organisations) the country’s trend growth rate has fallen rather than 
rise.  The distinct shade of discourse in this debate is that, economic prosperity of a 
country is embedded in its social organisation and transformations of her institutions 
(political, economic and social) which are built from social capital. A high social 
capital within a country determines its beliefs, attitudes, identities and values as well 
as access to power. These help to build social cohesion which is a determining factor 
in the building of efficient institutions that are pivotal to economic development. 
Formal institutions that grow out of development are usually a reflection of the 
interest of the more powerful individuals or rent-seekers. Liberalized (better) 
institutions are only possible in an ethnolinquistic fractionalized country like Nigeria 
where there exists a strong social capital. To possess social capital, a person must be 
related to others, and it is the others, not himself, who are the actual source of his or 
her advantage (Portes, 1998). Social capital is said to exist only when it is shared and 
not the private property of those who benefit from it. Since social capital is 
embedded in social structure it therefore means that; when a majority of people 
especially the more powerful (political players), different ethnolingustic groups and 
fractions coordinate themselves to achieve better institutions for desired economic 
development goals; in this case the causality is from institutions to development. The 
result of which is a high social capital. For Nigeria, one defining characteristic as a 
modern society is her heterogeneity of ethnicity, caste and religion with social 
division. Even with the practice of democracy, harmonious living is difficult. 
Therefore building a better institution for economic development may seem 
impossible except through the mechanism of social capital which entails the process 
of reconciling conflicts among major social, political and economic interest groups. 
 
4. Social capital and institutional deficit (bankruptcy) in the 
Economic Development of Nigeria 
 Institutions are expected to facilitate the generation of ideas, define property 
rights and contracts, and stimulate innovation, lower transaction costs and correct 
government failures, (Ajayi, 2002). The reduction of uncertainty in an economy 
through the improvement of allocative efficiency, reduction of transaction cost, 
enforcement of property rights and the rule of law as well as total government failure 
can guarantee suitable economic well-being and development. Institutional failure 
which give rise to political corruption poses a serious threat to the stability of 
developing democracies like Nigeria by, amongst other things, eroding the links 
between citizens and governments, deepening the poverty problem and further 
widening the gap between the rich and the poor and causing ethnolinguistic and 
religious divide (Fukuyama, 2004; Stiglitz, 2002). The danger that institutional 
failure poses to Nigeria as developing heterogeneous nation is that it runs the risk of 
poisoning public sentiment toward democratic politics and peaceful coexistence. It 
also makes the general populace suspicious of the entire public policy system. This 
is because, human interactions are bounded by a variety of institutional arrangements 
both informal and formal glued together by the different types of social capital 
(Miruka & Omenya 2009). 
Policies of a country are not more effective than the institutions that underlie 
them. This is because it is the existing institutions in a country that determine the 
nature of policy to be chosen and the way they are executed. Often time’s weak 
institutions are complemented by weak policy. For example ‚A strong and vibrant 
democracy in Nigeria cannot work well when there is no effective Independent 
National Electoral Commission (INEC), internal party democracy (within political 
parties) a weak National Assembly, ineffective Policing and Judiciary as well as the 
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rule of law‛. However, the effectiveness of these institutions depends on the social 
capital of the citizenry at the prevailing time. 
Since institutions and social capital overlie each other, therefore, it is not easy to 
separate them as they complement each other for prosperity and well-being of any 
economy be it developing or developed. There are ample evidences why the 
Nigerian institutions and social capital are losing grip. Social capital produces a 
blend of good and bad that shapes the way choices are made in the societies and how 
institutions evolve. Right from independence, Nigeria institutions have experienced 
retrogression as a result of different governance regimes. These regimes range from 
totalitarian regimes to liberal democracy all with a shortfall in social capital and 
institutional strengthening. 
Nigeria as an environment of weak institutions and institutional framework has 
experienced continuous decline in productive activities and high cost of transaction, 
transformation and governance which affects growth and development. 
An analysis by World Bank, (1997) and Ajayi, (2002) of various institutional 
variables show that corruption which is defined as ‚the abuse of public power for 
private gain‛ is growing in leaps and bounds. Corruption thrives in Nigeria because 
of the weakness of institutions of restraint and eroding social capital. Corruption 
creates a gap in the economic growth and development of Nigeria through 
misallocation of human talents to rent-seeking rather than productive activities. The 
consequences of corruption in Nigerian economy is its negative impact on growth 
and development; through lowering/decay in quality of physical infrastructure, 
investment(domestic and foreign), reduction in the ability to provide for the rule of 
law, tax revenue, income inequality, worsening resource distribution. Corruption has 
created a wide gap in Nigerian economic development from independence because 
the consequences of being caught and disciplined are getting lower by the day, as it 
is found in all facets of the economy. As the day go bye, corruption is being 
institutionalized into our social, political and economic fabric perpetuated by the 
very highly placed and stakeholders within the government. 
Ethno-linguistic fractionalization is another institutional variable that has a 
significant negative effect on the growth and development of the Nigeria economy. 
According to Easterly & Levine (1997), its effect is a crucial and determining factor 
in explaining the poor performance of African economies, of which Nigeria is a key 
culprit. The different ethnic and religious fractionalization in Nigeria is a classic 
example of the scenario. With this kind of situation, it is often difficult to reach a 
consensus on policies because there is usually no trust amongst the conflicting 
groups, who sees public good as a common good to have full control of (resource 
control). This situation is found in Nigeria within the oil rich Niger Delta Region and 
the Boko Haram insurgent which has blown ill winds to Nigeria. 
Bureaucracy and government size are another institutional issue that are harmful 
to development. An inefficient bureaucracy may be associated with lengthy and 
expensive ineffective procedures that may lead to low level of productivity, poor 
enforcement of law and contracts, which are indirectly costly and negative.  On the 
aspect of government size; a large government with weak institutions is of great 
danger to development. In Nigeria, the large size of government is causing colossal 
waste on government revenue that would have been used for meaningful 
development. Misappropriation of money to unproductive ventures as a result of 
large government from the local government up to the federal is a major factor 
militating against economic prosperity in Nigeria. Human capital development can 
be said to be the main engine of growth and development. Human capital 
accumulation is found in training such as universities, hospitals and research 
institutions, production activities and trade. In Nigeria, all the institutions responsible 
for human capital accumulation and development have continually being run down. 
Often times, they are near zero funding for training and research in Nigeria. 
Sometimes salaries are not being paid and infrastructure allowed decaying to ground 
level. This situation is tantamount to depriving the economy of reaching necessary 
growth and development level. The poor quality of institutions in Nigeria can by no 
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means be compared to any world standard. This situation has been on the decline 
right from independence through the military era up to the democratic dispensation 
of today. 
 
5.Measure/ categorization of institutions and social capital in 
Nigeria  
There are a variety of institutional measures and categorisation by different 
researchers. One of the confusion in this area is problem of data and methodology to 
adequately identify social capital and categorize institutions. Studies like Halliwell, 
(1994; 1996) have looked at the importance of democracy, social capital and 
political rights on economic performance in developing countries; while studies like 
that of Mauro (1995) evaluated the role of bureaucratic efficiency and corruption on 
growth. Other works that support the rule of law (property rights) as a determining 
factor for economic growth include (Godsmith1995; Lablang, 1997; Knack & Keefer 
1995).  
Social capital as a potential contributor to the formation of vibrant institutions 
necessary for poverty reduction and sustainable development may be difficult to 
measure; except using qualitative, quantitative and comparative proxies to surmount 
these difficulties. The difficulties in the measure of social capital are as a result of 
the inability to measure indexes such as trust, civic engagement and community 
involvement. Studies like that of Knack & Keafer (1997) have measured social 
capital quantitatively using the indicators of trust and civic norms from world values 
surveys (which measures interpersonal trust) as proxies for strength and civic 
associations to test social capital and economic growth. They tested two 
propositions; the ‚Olson effect‛ and ‚Putnam effect‛ which holds that association 
stifle growth through rent-seeking and association facilitate growth by increasing 
trust, respectively. Another quantitative measure of social capital is that of Narayan 
& Pritchett (1997) in Tanzania using data from Tanzania social and capital survey. 
The survey was based on extent and trust in various institutions and individuals. 
Findings showed that a positive relationship exist between village level social capital 
and income. Putnam (1993) in a comparative study of north and south Italy examines 
social capital ‚in terms of degree of civic involvement, as measured by voters’ 
turnout, newspaper readership, membership in choral societies and football clubs and 
confidence in public institutions. 
 In view of the complexity of measurement and categorisation, this study 
measures social capital using confidence in government of the day, trust in 
government policies, interpersonal trust amongst the three major ethnic groups in 
Nigeria (Yoruba, Ibo and Hausa), confidence in electoral system, willingness to go 
out of the country and listening to national news (NTA News). The study categorises 
institutions into three broad groups similar to Ajayi (2002). These include regulatory 
institutions, property rights institutions and conflict management institutions. The 
Property rights institutions are also embedded in the economic institutions because 
they influence allocation of resources to the most efficient uses and determine 
residual right of control as well as who gets profit. The conflict management and 
regulatory institutions are responsible for the ethnicity, religious sentiments and 
fractionalisation of the heterogeneous nature of Nigeria. To control public violence 
and insecurity for economic growth, this institution must be effective. 
 
6. Methodology 
The study is set to empirically measure the quality (degree, effectiveness and 
efficiency) of social capital and institutions in Nigeria by using primary and 
secondary sources. Data from the secondary sources are time series data that 
compares the quality of institutions variable in Nigeria over a particular period, 
(from 1986, 1995 to 2013) to ascertain the extent of improvement or decay. The 
primary sources involve administering structural questionnaires to respondents on 
stated variables to capture social capital and institutional measures. The study was 
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based on three hundred respondents drawn randomly from the different socio- 
economic and political strata within six States to cover the major ethnic groups and 
Abuja Federal Capital Territory (the states include Cross River-South South; Enugu-
South Eastern; Lagos- South-western; Benue and Abuja FCT -North Central; 
Kaduna- North Western; Borno-North Eastern) across the six geopolitical zones. 
Initially Four hundred and Fifty five copies of the questionnaires were sent out. Sixty 
five (65 per state and FCT) copies of questionnaires were administered using 
purposive simple random sampling on various respondents perceived to be 
responsible and objective such as, Politicians, Religious, Public servants, Students, 
Business men, women and the responsible local villagers in each of the  state. Out of 
the four hundred and fifty five (455) copies of questionnaires mailed out to the states 
only three hundred (300 copies) were properly completed and returned from the 
whole respondents. The study was eventually based on three hundred respondents. 
This number represents the sample size in this study.  
The questionnaire was designed in such a manner as to solicit responses in the 
following areas: Trust; Civic engagement; Community and volunteering services; 
Quality of institutions in Nigeria; Effectiveness and efficiency of institutions (within 
the two eras); The influence and impacts of institutions on Economic development. 
To ascertain the quality and effectiveness of institutions in Nigeria, the 
institutions were categorised into regulatory, property rights and conflict 
management institutions which are embedded in the political, economic and social 
institutions. The study is divided into two eras. The era starts from 1970 to 1998 (era 
of truncated democracies) and the beginning of new democratic era 1999 to 2015. 
The qualitative results were expressed in percentages showing the degree of social 
capital, effectiveness and quality of institutions and their impact on economic 
development. The measure of institutional quality is difficult when the objects of 
measurement are conceptual composites, made up of concrete institutions such as 
governance, property right system (Glaeser et al., 2004; Kaufmann et al., 1999; 
2002; 2007; Acemoglu et al., 2001). This is more questionable and challenging 
because the concept is encompassing composing of a wide range of component 
institutions. However, in respect to this confusion, some studies like, Aron (2000) 
have argued the function variables should be preferred over the form variables. In 
practice, these indexes mix up incompatible variables that capture the differences in 
the forms of institutions(such as democracy, independent judiciary, absence of state 
ownership) and functions that they perform (such as rule of law, respect for private 
property, government effectiveness, enforceability of contract, maintenance of price 
stability, the restraint on corruption etc.)  
Based on the argument and confusion of measurement, therefore, this study will 
make use of variables such as; confidence in government,  trust in government 
policies, interpersonal trust amongst the three major ethnic groups in Nigeria 
(Yoruba, Ibo and Hausa), confidence in electoral system, willingness to go out of the 
country as well as listening to national news (NTA News) to measure degree of 
social capital. It will also measure quality of concrete institutions such as, Central 
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Table 1.  Measure of degree of social capital in Nigeria (1970-1998 and 1999-2015) 
















 Trust % % %  
1. Trust in government policies 58 22 20 -(negative) very Low 
2. Confidence in government 40 40 20 -+ Fair 
3. Interpersonal trust amongst major ethnic 
groups (Yoruba, Ibo and Hausa) 
61 24 15 _ (negative) Low 
 Civic engagement     
1. Voters turnout 60 40  -+ Fair 
2. Confidence in electoral system 57 40 3 -+ fair 
3. Willingness to leave country for better places 35 65 5 -(negative)  
 Community service and volunteering     
1. Listening to Nigeria  news (NTA News) 65 35  -(negative) Very low 
2. Reading daily newspapers 50 50 10 -(negative) Very low 
Source: Field survey September 2015. 
 
Table 2. Measure of Institutions Quality in Nigeria (1970-1998 and 1999-2015) 















 Regulatory Institutions % % %  
1. Effective legal system 50 30 20 -(negative) Low 
2. Legislative system 40 40 20 -+ Fair 
3. Institution of Restraint(police etc) 62 38  _ (negative) Low 
4. Maintenance of price stability (CBN) 60 40  -+ Fair 
5. Restraint on Corruption 65 30 5 -(negative) low 
6. Inefficient Bureaucracy 40 40 20 -+ Fair 
7. Human capital development 60 40  -+ fair 
8. Effectiveness and independence of CBN 52 35 13 -(negative) low 
 Property Rights Institutions     
1. Enforceability of contracts 60 40  -+ Fair 
2. Protection of property rights 57 43  -+ fair 
3. Protection of foreign investors 45 50 5 +(positive) good 
 Conflict management institutions     
1. Ethnicity/Fractionalization 60 40  -(negative) Very low 
2. Religious tolerance 60 30 10 -(negative) Very low 
3. Security 60 30 10 -(negative) Very Low) 
Source: Field survey September 2015  
Note: ** key=(+ good ie the institutions are impacting positively on Economic Development,-+ fair i.e 
the institutions are impacting fairly on economic development - very poor i.e institutions are impacting 
very negatively on Economic Development, ) 
 
7.  Discussion of Empirical Result 
Empirical results from the qualitative survey on the degree of social capital and 
the quality of institutions in Nigeria are presented in Table 1 and 2 respectively. The 
survey result on social capital shows that trust in government policies is perceived to 
be as low as 22% from 1999 to 2015 against 58% in 1970 to 1998. The conclusion 
drawn from this finding is that since there is less trust in government by citizens, 
therefore the bond which ones glue the society together for development is absent.  
In terms of interpersonal trust among the three major ethnic groups that make up 
Nigeria (Ibo, Yoruba and Hausa); empirical result from the survey shows that there 
is no strong interpersonal trust amongst these ethnic groups which ones coexisted. 
Empirically interpersonal trust amongst these major ethnic groups declined from 
61% (1970- 1998) to as low as 24% from 1999 to 2015. This confirms absence of 
strong bond within the major tribes that make up Nigeria. Empirical survey result of 
civic engagement as a measure of social capital shows a declining confidence in the 
electoral system of Nigeria by her citizens. Voters turnout during elections and 
confidence in the electoral system decline from 67%, 57% from 1970 to 1998 and 
40% from 1999 to 2015. respectively This supports findings by Junge (2014) who 
compared  individuals born and residing in the same country, those whose father was 
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born in a more democratic country express higher trust than those whose father was 
born in a less democratic country.  
The enthusiasm to leave Nigeria to other countries for livelihood by her citizens 
increased from 35% in 1970 to 1998 to as high as 65% from 1999 to 2015. In 
conclusion, commitment to Nigeria stock of social capital by her citizens is declining 
by the day and this can have an untold negative impact on the institutions and 
development. In terms of community service as a measure of social capital, the 
extent to which citizens’ listen to national news has declined from 65% to 35 during 
the period under review. Table 2 shows that institutional variables such as; effective 
legal system, institutional restraint and restraint on corruption are not perceived 
effective, with very low percentages (30%, 38%and 30% respectively). This could 
impact negatively on the economic growth and development thereby, creating a gap 
as against the earlier perceptions at 50%, 62% and 65% respectively. From the 
result, it can be deduced that the variables under study were perceived more 
qualitative and effective from 1970 to 1998. Earlier before now (1970’s), corruption 
was seen as a major threat facing humanity, destroying lives and communities, and 
undermining countries and institutions. Further, corruption was seen to translate into 
human sufferings emanating from the failure in the delivery of basic services like 
education, healthcare etc. by corrupt leaders.  All these are factors that have created a 
gap for development in Nigeria. On the other hand,, maintenance of price stability, 
human capital development and the Nigeria legislative system are seen to have a fair 
impact on development, while the independence of the Central Bank of Nigeria in 
terms of monetary policy management is perceived to have had a significant positive 
impact on the economic development of Nigeria from 1999 to 2015 than in the 
earlier period (1970 to 1998) according to the survey result. 
Property rights institutional variables like enforceability of contracts, protection 
of property rights and protection of foreign investment are perceived to have a fair 
and positive impact in Nigeria. This is evidenced in the nature of foreign direct 
investment (FDI) into Nigeria. However, conflict management institutional variables 
such as ethnicity/ fractionalization, religious intolerance, and insecurity (are the most 
challenging). These variables are of great concern to the economic growth and 
development of Nigeria. It is anticipated that these may likely be the variables that 
would drag Nigeria back to another civil war. The fact remains that social capital and 
the bond of togetherness is beginning to be loose gradually creating a crack in the 
economic development of Nigeria.  It is the deterioration in the way that Nigerians 
perceive and view the functioning of these institutions that determine the level of 
trust and confidence they have in the system and this either motivates or discourages 
them from being fully committed to their jobs and service delivery. This definitely 
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Table 3. Data on Measure of Quality of Institutional Variables in Nigeria 




























1986 1 + less 12.8 0.96 - 3.9 - 
1995 1 + less 16.6 3.84 - 2.4 - 
1996 7 -+ Fairly less 5.7 4.51 - 6.5 3.7 
1997 4 +less 16.0 4.25 - 3.1 2.3 
1998 1 + less 12.4 3.27 - 1.6 2.8 
1999 2 + less 12.7 2.89 - 1.0 6.3 
2000 7 -+ Fairly less 6.4 2.48 - 3.9 4.1 
2001 6 + less 6.0 2.48 - - 5.3 
2002 8 + less 11.3 3.17 - - 1.0 
2003 9 + less 0.8 2.96 - - 0.8 
2004 5 + less 11.3 2.13 - 10.5 2.9 
2005 7 + less 0.8 4.44 - 6.5 0.5 
2006 8 + less 16.4 3.34 26 6.0 3.2 
2007 10 +less 22.5  32 6.4 2.3 
2008 21 + less 12.9 3.96 59 6.0 2.8 
2009 18 -+ Fairly less 13.8 5.07 50 7.0 3.6 
2010 16 -+Fairly less 12.5 2.65 44 8.0 3.8 
2011 203 -(negative) 31.5 3.65 39 7.4 2.8 
2012 864 -(negative) 34.8 - 35 6.6 4.8 
2013 699 -(negative) 37.5 - 37 6.7 5.2 
2014 805 -(negative)      
2015 879 -(negative)      
Sources: Authors computation from:  Nigeria security Tracker - Council on Foreign Relations.htm,  
Sahara reporters.com, Uk. Reuters.com,Bbc.co.uk, Allafrica.com, Channelstv.com, Vanguardngr.com, 
Transparency international, African Economic outlook, World bank world development indicator, 
(Various years) 
 
Table 3, shows time series macro-socio economic data on the quality of 
institutional variables in Nigeria.  The data on insecurity (comprising various bomb 
blasts, kidnapping, Boko haram and Niger delta militia insurgency) is a pointer to the 
fact that insecurity in Nigeria, has been on the increase. This further shows its 
declining positive impact on economic development, beyond restraint by the years. 
Also from the table, public violence is on the increase following the same line.  
 
 
Figure 1. Mapping Violence in Nigeria (2011-2016) 
Source: Copied from Council on foreign relations (CFR) 2016. 
 
Foreign direct investment which is the sum of equity capital, reinvestment of 
earnings and, other long and short term capital is achievable in a country with 
minimum risk of security and high ease of doing business. According to Ajayi 
(2002) the factors necessary to attract foreign Direct Investment include a conducive 
macroeconomic policy environment. Also increased liberalization of markets, liberal 
trade regimes, adequate infrastructure, law and order for the protection of property 
rights and business facilitation measures are determining factors. However from our 
data, FDI is not very encouraging as expected due to the limiting institutional 
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factors. Other variables such as corruption perception index and public protest are 




The central discuss of this paper is on the measure, of the impact of the quality, 
degree, effectiveness and efficiency of social capital and institutions on the 
economic development of Nigeria. The daunting challenge remains the degree of 
social capital and the perception and complexity of institutions to the economic 
prosperity of Nigeria.  It can be concluded that, the economic prosperity of a country 
is embedded in its social organisation and transformations of her institutions which 
are built from social capital. The perceptions that Nigerians have about her 
institutions are not very positive; as a result the mechanism through which social 
capital strengthens the institution for national development is weak. Accordingly, a 
high social capital within a country determines its beliefs, attitudes, identities and 
values as well as access to power. These help to build social cohesion which is 
pivotal to economic development. This is in agreement with Rothstein & Stolle 
(2008) who submits that generalized trust is built up by the citizens themselves 
through a culture that permeates the networks and organizations of civil society.  
Trust thrives most in societies with effective, impartial, and fair street-level 
bureaucracies. 
Therefore, Nigeria government must take a tougher stance against the abuse of 
power and employ the mechanism of social capital, which enhances the process of 
reconciling conflict among major social, political and economic interest groups. 
Therefore, to stop this ugly monster, anti-corruption actions should be integrated into 
all aspects of decision-making. This must be pursued seriously in other to achieve 
maximally the goal of sustainable economic development by institutional 





i The formal and informal pressure on developing countries come from various bilateral, regional and 
multilateral trade and investment agreements, in addition to loans/aid conditionalities and 
international rules. E.g IMF, World Bank, OECD, G7, World Economic Forum, World Trade 
Organisation (WTO) which forces developing countries to adopt American style Intellectual Property 
Rights (IPRs) laws through the trade-related intellectual property Rights (TRIPR) agreement. Chapter 
11 of NAFTA (North American Free Trade Agreement) which changes completely the institutions 
through which the member-country government regulate corporations (see Chang, 2010) 
ii  Better institutions are those institutions that are typically found in Anglo-American countries 
characterised by maximizing market freedom and protecting private property rights to its fullest. 
iii Effective property rights include (i) a common legal system which promotes free contracts and 
protects the individuals rights (ii) A sound financial system based on private ownership and 
developed capital market (iii) An industrial system based on private ownership, which requires 
privatization in many countries. (iv) A sound financial regime that is regulated which encourages 
‘prudence’ and stability with a politically independent central bank. (vi) A flexible labour market that 
allows quick re-allocation of labour in response of price changes. (vii) A stable political system that 
restricts arbitrary actions of political rulers and their agents. (viii) A safe and security conscious 
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